

Applied Cryptology

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Keep in mind there are *two* PDFs available (of which this is the latter):

1. a PDF of examinable material used as lecture slides, and
2. a PDF of non-examinable, extra material:
 - ▶ the associated notes page may be pre-populated with extra, written explanation of material covered in lecture(s), plus
 - ▶ anything with a "grey'ed out" header/footer represents extra material which is useful and/or interesting but out of scope (and hence not covered).

Notes:

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- ▶ **Agenda:** explore the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), i.e.,

Square [4] \rightsquigarrow Rijndael [5] \rightsquigarrow AES [2, 8],

via

1. an “in theory”, i.e., design-oriented perspective, and
2. an “in practice”, i.e., implementation-oriented perspective,

- ▶ **Caveat!**

~ 2 hours \Rightarrow introductory, and (very) selective (versus definitive) coverage.


Part 1: in theory (1)

Specification

- ▶ AES is an (iterated) block cipher, where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ENC} &: \{0,1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nk} \times \{0,1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb} \\ \text{DEC} &: \{0,1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nk} \times \{0,1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{8 \cdot 4 \cdot Nb} \end{aligned}$$

are realised by using a **substitution-permutation network**



i.e., $Nr + 1$ rounds: each r -th round

- ▶ applies one or more **round functions**,
- ▶ involves a **round key** $rk^{(r)}$ derived from the **cipher key** k .

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (2)

Specification

- ▶ AES is actually a *family* of block ciphers: per [8, Figure 3], the parameter sets are

	Nk	Nb	Nr
AES-128	4	4	10
AES-192	6	4	12
AES-256	8	4	14

but we'll focus *exclusively* on AES-128 encryption only.

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (3)

Low(er)-level concepts/components

- ▶ AES [8, Section 4] operates on elements in the **finite field** \mathbb{F}_{2^8} , which is realised concretely as

$$\mathbb{F}_2[x]/p(x)$$

where

$$p(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$$

meaning

- ▶ a given field element is represented using a polynomial whose **indeterminate** is x ,
- ▶ coefficients of such polynomials are in the field \mathbb{F}_2 , and
- ▶ arithmetic with field elements is modulo an **irreducible polynomial** $p(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$.

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (4)

Low(er)-level concepts/components

► Beware!

- a hexadecimal short-hand is used for immediate field elements, e.g.,

$$13 \mapsto 13_{(16)} \equiv 00010011_{(2)} \equiv \langle 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0 \rangle_{(\mathbf{x})} \mapsto \mathbf{x}^4 + \mathbf{x} + 1,$$

and

- to avoid confusion, we carefully highlight where arithmetic in some field F is required, e.g.,

\oplus_F	\mapsto	"addition in the field F "
\ominus_F	\mapsto	"subtraction in the field F "
\otimes_F	\mapsto	"multiplication in the field F "
\oslash_F	\mapsto	"division in the field F "

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (4)

Low(er)-level concepts/components

► Beware!

- we can ignore/avoid *most* field arithmetic, but rely on at least:

1. addition, i.e.,

$$r = x \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} y \mapsto x \oplus y.$$

2. multiplication-by-x, i.e.,

$$r = \text{xtimes}(x) = x \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \mapsto \begin{cases} \langle 0, x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6 \rangle \oplus \langle 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0 \rangle & \text{if } x_7 = 1 \\ \langle 0, x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6 \rangle & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

3. multiplication-by-c, e.g.,

$$\begin{aligned} r &= 01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = 1 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = x \\ r &= 02 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = x \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = \text{xtimes}(x) \\ r &= 03 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = (x + 1) \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = \text{xtimes}(x) \oplus x \end{aligned}$$

Notes:

► Beware!

Notes:

- we can ignore/avoid *most* field arithmetic, but rely on at least:

1. **addition**, i.e.,

$$r = x \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} y \mapsto x \oplus y.$$

2. **multiplication-by-x**, i.e.,

$$r = \text{xtimes}(x) = x \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \mapsto \begin{cases} (x \ll 1) \oplus 11B & \text{if } x_7 = 1 \\ x \ll 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

3. **multiplication-by-c**, e.g.,

$$\begin{aligned} r &= 01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = 1 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = x \\ r &= 02 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = x \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = \text{xtimes}(x) \\ r &= 03 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = (x + 1) \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x = \text{xtimes}(x) \oplus x \end{aligned}$$

- AES [8, Section 3.4] organises field elements into (4×4) -element matrices, e.g.,

1. the *r*-th **state matrix**

$$s^{(r)} = \begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0}^{(r)} & s_{0,1}^{(r)} & s_{0,2}^{(r)} & s_{0,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,0}^{(r)} & s_{1,1}^{(r)} & s_{1,2}^{(r)} & s_{1,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,0}^{(r)} & s_{2,1}^{(r)} & s_{2,2}^{(r)} & s_{2,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,0}^{(r)} & s_{3,1}^{(r)} & s_{3,2}^{(r)} & s_{3,3}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix}$$

for each $s_{i,j}^{(r)} \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, or

2. the *r*-th **round key matrix**

$$rk^{(r)} = \begin{bmatrix} rk_{0,0}^{(r)} & rk_{0,1}^{(r)} & rk_{0,2}^{(r)} & rk_{0,3}^{(r)} \\ rk_{1,0}^{(r)} & rk_{1,1}^{(r)} & rk_{1,2}^{(r)} & rk_{1,3}^{(r)} \\ rk_{2,0}^{(r)} & rk_{2,1}^{(r)} & rk_{2,2}^{(r)} & rk_{2,3}^{(r)} \\ rk_{3,0}^{(r)} & rk_{3,1}^{(r)} & rk_{3,2}^{(r)} & rk_{3,3}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix}$$

for each $rk_{i,j}^{(r)} \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$,

which can be read from (resp. written to) in column-wise order.

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (6)

Low(er)-level concepts/components

- AES [8, Section 5.1.1] uses a single S-box, defined as the composition of two functions, i.e.,

$$\text{S-BOX}(x) = (f \circ g)(x) = f(g(x)),$$

where

$$g(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x = 0 \\ 1 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

i.e., g is a field (pseudo-)inversion, and

$$f \left(\begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \\ x_6 \\ x_7 \end{bmatrix} \right) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_2} \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \\ x_6 \\ x_7 \end{bmatrix} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

is an affine transformation.

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (6)

Low(er)-level concepts/components

- AES [8, Section 5.1.1] uses a single S-box, defined as the composition of two functions, i.e.,

$$\text{S-BOX}(x) = (f \circ g)(x) = f(g(x)),$$

where

$$g(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x = 0 \\ 1 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

i.e., g is a field (pseudo-)inversion, and

$$f \left(\begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \\ x_6 \\ x_7 \end{bmatrix} \right) = \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} & x_4 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_5 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_6 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_7 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} 1 \\ x_0 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_1 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} & x_5 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_6 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_7 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} 1 \\ x_0 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_1 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_2 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} & x_6 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_7 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} 0 \\ x_0 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_1 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_2 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_3 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} & x_7 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} 0 \\ x_0 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_1 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_2 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_3 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_4 & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} 0 \\ x_1 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_2 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_3 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_4 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_5 & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} 1 \\ x_2 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_3 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_4 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_5 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_6 & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} 1 \\ x_3 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_4 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_5 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_6 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} x_7 \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_2} 0 & \end{bmatrix}$$

is an affine transformation.

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (7)

High(er)-level concepts/components

Algorithm (AES round functions [8, Section 5.1])

Input: A state matrix $s^{(r)}$, and a round key matrix $rk^{(r)}$

Output: A state matrix $s'^{(r)} = \text{AddRoundKey}(s^{(r)}, rk^{(r)})$

$$s'^{(r)} = \text{AddRoundKey}(s^{(r)}, rk^{(r)})$$

$$= \text{AddRoundKey} \left(\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0}^{(r)} & s_{0,1}^{(r)} & s_{0,2}^{(r)} & s_{0,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,0}^{(r)} & s_{1,1}^{(r)} & s_{1,2}^{(r)} & s_{1,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,0}^{(r)} & s_{2,1}^{(r)} & s_{2,2}^{(r)} & s_{2,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,0}^{(r)} & s_{3,1}^{(r)} & s_{3,2}^{(r)} & s_{3,3}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} rk_{0,0}^{(r)} & rk_{0,1}^{(r)} & rk_{0,2}^{(r)} & rk_{0,3}^{(r)} \\ rk_{1,0}^{(r)} & rk_{1,1}^{(r)} & rk_{1,2}^{(r)} & rk_{1,3}^{(r)} \\ rk_{2,0}^{(r)} & rk_{2,1}^{(r)} & rk_{2,2}^{(r)} & rk_{2,3}^{(r)} \\ rk_{3,0}^{(r)} & rk_{3,1}^{(r)} & rk_{3,2}^{(r)} & rk_{3,3}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \left(s_{0,0}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{0,0}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{0,1}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{0,1}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{0,2}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{0,2}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{0,3}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{0,3}^{(r)} \right) \\ \left(s_{1,0}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{1,0}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{1,1}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{1,1}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{1,2}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{1,2}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{1,3}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{1,3}^{(r)} \right) \\ \left(s_{2,0}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{2,0}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{2,1}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{2,1}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{2,2}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{2,2}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{2,3}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{2,3}^{(r)} \right) \\ \left(s_{3,0}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{3,0}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{3,1}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{3,1}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{3,2}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{3,2}^{(r)} \right) & \left(s_{3,3}^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{3,3}^{(r)} \right) \end{bmatrix}$$

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (7)

High(er)-level concepts/components

Algorithm (AES round functions [8, Section 5.1])

Input: A state matrix $s^{(r)}$

Output: A state matrix $s'^{(r)} = \text{SubBytes}(s^{(r)})$

$$s'^{(r)} = \text{SubBytes}(s^{(r)})$$

$$= \text{SubBytes} \left(\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0}^{(r)} & s_{0,1}^{(r)} & s_{0,2}^{(r)} & s_{0,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,0}^{(r)} & s_{1,1}^{(r)} & s_{1,2}^{(r)} & s_{1,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,0}^{(r)} & s_{2,1}^{(r)} & s_{2,2}^{(r)} & s_{2,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,0}^{(r)} & s_{3,1}^{(r)} & s_{3,2}^{(r)} & s_{3,3}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{0,0}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{0,1}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{0,2}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{0,3}^{(r)}\right) \\ \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{1,0}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{1,1}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{1,2}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{1,3}^{(r)}\right) \\ \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{2,0}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{2,1}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{2,2}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{2,3}^{(r)}\right) \\ \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{3,0}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{3,1}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{3,2}^{(r)}\right) & \text{S-BOX}\left(s_{3,3}^{(r)}\right) \end{bmatrix}$$

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (7)

High(er)-level concepts/components

Algorithm (AES round functions [8, Section 5.1])

Input: A state matrix $s^{(r)}$
Output: A state matrix $s'^{(r)} = \text{ShiftRows}(s^{(r)})$

$$\begin{aligned} s'^{(r)} &= \text{ShiftRows}(s^{(r)}) \\ &= \text{ShiftRows} \left(\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0}^{(r)} & s_{0,1}^{(r)} & s_{0,2}^{(r)} & s_{0,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,0}^{(r)} & s_{1,1}^{(r)} & s_{1,2}^{(r)} & s_{1,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,0}^{(r)} & s_{2,1}^{(r)} & s_{2,2}^{(r)} & s_{2,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,0}^{(r)} & s_{3,1}^{(r)} & s_{3,2}^{(r)} & s_{3,3}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \right) \\ &= \begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0}^{(r)} & s_{0,1}^{(r)} & s_{0,2}^{(r)} & s_{0,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,1}^{(r)} & s_{1,2}^{(r)} & s_{1,3}^{(r)} & s_{1,0}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,2}^{(r)} & s_{2,3}^{(r)} & s_{2,0}^{(r)} & s_{2,1}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,3}^{(r)} & s_{3,0}^{(r)} & s_{3,1}^{(r)} & s_{3,2}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

Notes:

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Part 1: in theory (7)

High(er)-level concepts/components

Algorithm (AES round functions [8, Section 5.1])

Input: A state matrix $s^{(r)}$
Output: A state matrix $s'^{(r)} = \text{MixColumns}(s^{(r)})$

$$\begin{aligned} s'^{(r)} &= \text{MixColumns}(s^{(r)}) \\ &= \text{MixColumns} \left(\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,0}^{(r)} & s_{0,1}^{(r)} & s_{0,2}^{(r)} & s_{0,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,0}^{(r)} & s_{1,1}^{(r)} & s_{1,2}^{(r)} & s_{1,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,0}^{(r)} & s_{2,1}^{(r)} & s_{2,2}^{(r)} & s_{2,3}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,0}^{(r)} & s_{3,1}^{(r)} & s_{3,2}^{(r)} & s_{3,3}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \right) \end{aligned}$$

where each column of the result, i.e., for each $0 \leq j < 4$, is produced via

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} &= \text{MixColumn} \left(\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \right) = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \\ &= \begin{bmatrix} \left(02 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(03 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)} \right) \\ \left(01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(02 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(03 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)} \right) \\ \left(01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(02 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(03 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)} \right) \\ \left(03 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(01 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)} \right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \left(02 \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)} \right) \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

Notes:

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Part 1: in theory (8)

High(er)-level concepts/components

Algorithm (AES-128.ENC-KEYEXPAND [8, Section 5.2])

Input: A 128-bit cipher key k

Output: An 11-element sequence $rk = \text{AES-128.ENC-KEYEXPAND}(k) \simeq \text{ExpandRoundKey}(k)$ of round keys

Generate a sequence of column vectors

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{round key } rk^{(0)} \\ \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,0} \\ w_{1,0} \\ w_{2,0} \\ w_{3,0} \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,1} \\ w_{1,1} \\ w_{2,1} \\ w_{3,1} \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,2} \\ w_{1,2} \\ w_{2,2} \\ w_{3,2} \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,3} \\ w_{1,3} \\ w_{2,3} \\ w_{3,3} \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,4} \\ w_{1,4} \\ w_{2,4} \\ w_{3,4} \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,5} \\ w_{1,5} \\ w_{2,5} \\ w_{3,5} \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,6} \\ w_{1,6} \\ w_{2,6} \\ w_{3,6} \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,7} \\ w_{1,7} \\ w_{2,7} \\ w_{3,7} \end{array} \right] \dots \end{array}$$

using the following rules

1. in the j -th column-vector for $0 \leq j < Nk$, we set $w_{i,j} = k_{i,j}$ to match the cipher key,

2. in the j -th column-vector for $Nk \leq j < Nb \cdot (Nr + 1)$ we set

$$\left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,j} \\ w_{1,j} \\ w_{2,j} \\ w_{3,j} \end{array} \right] = \begin{cases} \left[\begin{array}{c} rc_{j/Nk} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-BOX}(w_{1,j-1}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{0,j-Nk} \\ \text{S-BOX}(w_{2,j-1}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{1,j-Nk} \\ \text{S-BOX}(w_{3,j-1}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{2,j-Nk} \\ \text{S-BOX}(w_{0,j-1}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{3,j-Nk} \\ w_{0,j-1} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{0,j-Nk} \\ w_{1,j-1} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{1,j-Nk} \\ w_{2,j-1} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{2,j-Nk} \\ w_{3,j-1} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{3,j-Nk} \end{array} \right] & \text{if } j = 0 \pmod{Nk} \\ \left[\begin{array}{c} w_{0,j-1} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{0,j-Nk} \\ w_{1,j-1} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{1,j-Nk} \\ w_{2,j-1} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{2,j-Nk} \\ w_{3,j-1} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} w_{3,j-Nk} \end{array} \right] & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

then combining them to yield a sequence of round keys, where $rc^{(r)} = x^{r-1}$ denotes the r -th round constant.

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (9)

High(er)-level concepts/components

Algorithm (AES-128.ENC-KEYEVOLVE [8, Section 5.2])

Input: The r -th round key matrix $rk^{(r)}$ and round constant $rc^{(r)}$

Output: The $(r + 1)$ -th round key matrix $rk^{(r+1)} = \text{AES-128.ENC-KEYEVOLVE}(k) \simeq \text{"EvolveRoundKey"}(rk^{(r)}, rc^{(r)})$

1. Compute

$$\begin{aligned} rk_{0,0}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rc^{(r)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-BOX}\left(rk_{1,3}^{(r)}\right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{0,0}^{(r)} \\ rk_{1,0}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow \text{S-BOX}\left(rk_{2,3}^{(r)}\right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{1,0}^{(r)} \\ rk_{2,0}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow \text{S-BOX}\left(rk_{3,3}^{(r)}\right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{2,0}^{(r)} \\ rk_{3,0}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow \text{S-BOX}\left(rk_{0,3}^{(r)}\right) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{3,0}^{(r)} \end{aligned}$$

2. Compute

$$\begin{aligned} rk_{0,1}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{0,0}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{0,1}^{(r)} & rk_{1,1}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{1,0}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{1,1}^{(r)} \\ rk_{2,1}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{2,0}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{2,1}^{(r)} & rk_{3,1}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{3,0}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{3,1}^{(r)} \\ rk_{0,2}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{0,1}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{0,2}^{(r)} & rk_{1,2}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{1,1}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{1,2}^{(r)} \\ rk_{2,2}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{2,1}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{2,2}^{(r)} & rk_{3,2}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{3,1}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{3,2}^{(r)} \\ rk_{0,3}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{0,2}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{0,3}^{(r)} & rk_{1,3}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{1,2}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{1,3}^{(r)} \\ rk_{2,3}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{2,2}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{2,3}^{(r)} & rk_{3,3}^{(r+1)} &\leftarrow rk_{3,2}^{(r+1)} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} rk_{3,3}^{(r)} \end{aligned}$$

3. Return $rk^{(r+1)}$.

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (10)

High(er)-level concepts/components

Algorithm (AES-128.ENC [8, Section 5.1])

Input: A 128-bit cipher key k , and a 128-bit plaintext message m
Output: A 128-bit ciphertext message $c = \text{AES-128.ENC}(k, m)$

```
1  $rk \leftarrow \text{ExpandRoundKey}(k)$ 
2  $s \leftarrow m$ 
3  $s \leftarrow \text{AddRoundKey}(s, rk^{(0)})$ 
4 for  $r = 1$  upto  $Nr - 1$  step +1 do
5    $s \leftarrow \text{SubBytes}(s)$ 
6    $s \leftarrow \text{ShiftRows}(s)$ 
7    $s \leftarrow \text{MixColumns}(s)$ 
8    $s \leftarrow \text{AddRoundKey}(s, rk^{(r)})$ 
9 end
10  $s \leftarrow \text{SubBytes}(s)$ 
11  $s \leftarrow \text{ShiftRows}(s)$ 
12  $s \leftarrow \text{AddRoundKey}(s, rk^{(10)})$ 
13  $c \leftarrow s$ 
14 return  $c$ 
```

Notes:

Part 1: in theory (10)

High(er)-level concepts/components

Algorithm (AES-128.ENC [8, Section 5.1])

Input: A 128-bit cipher key k , and a 128-bit plaintext message m
Output: A 128-bit ciphertext message $c = \text{AES-128.ENC}(k, m)$


```
1  $s \leftarrow m$ 
2  $s \leftarrow \text{AddRoundKey}(s, k = rk^{(0)})$ 
3 for  $r = 1$  upto  $Nr - 1$  step +1 do
4    $k \leftarrow \text{EvolveRoundKey}(k, rc^{(r)})$ 
5    $s \leftarrow \text{SubBytes}(s)$ 
6    $s \leftarrow \text{ShiftRows}(s)$ 
7    $s \leftarrow \text{MixColumns}(s)$ 
8    $s \leftarrow \text{AddRoundKey}(s, k = rk^{(r)})$ 
9 end
10  $k \leftarrow \text{EvolveRoundKey}(k, rc^{(10)})$ 
11  $s \leftarrow \text{SubBytes}(s)$ 
12  $s \leftarrow \text{ShiftRows}(s)$ 
13  $s \leftarrow \text{AddRoundKey}(s, k = rk^{(10)})$ 
14  $c \leftarrow s$ 
15 return  $c$ 
```

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (1)

► Challenge:

- given a functionality "stack", i.e.,



Notes:

bridge gap between what we have (bottom) and want (top),

- an implementation strategy for doing so must consider many

- goals : parameter set, functionality, ...
 - metrics : latency, throughput, memory footprint, ...
 - constraints : hardware versus software, data-path width, ...
- ⋮

Part 2: in practice (2)

\mathbb{F}_{2^8} and $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}^{4 \times 4}$

- Given $x, y \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$,

$$\begin{aligned} r = x \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} y &\equiv x_i + y_i \pmod{2} \\ &\mapsto x_i \oplus y_i \end{aligned}$$

for $0 \leq i < 8$, and hence

$$x \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} y \equiv x \ominus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} y.$$

Listing

```
1 uint8_t aes_gf28_add( uint8_t x, uint8_t y ) {
2     return x ^ y;
3 }
4
5 uint8_t aes_gf28_sub( uint8_t x, uint8_t y ) {
6     return x ^ y;
7 }
```

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (3)

\mathbb{F}_{2^8} and $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}^{4 \times 4}$

- Given $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, to compute

$$\begin{aligned} r &= \text{xtimes}(x) = x \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ &\equiv x \times x(x) \pmod{p(x)} \end{aligned}$$

we

- compute

$$t(x) = x(x) \cdot x = \sum_{i=0}^{i<8} x_i \cdot x^{i+1},$$

i.e., shift the coefficients, then

- compute $r(x) = t(x) \pmod{p(x)}$ as

$$r(x) = \begin{cases} t(x) - p(x) & \text{if } t_8 = 1 \\ t(x) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

i.e., if $t_8 = 1$, we use the fact

$$x^8 \equiv x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \pmod{p(x)}$$

to reduce $t(x)$ modulo $p(x)$.

Listing

```

1 uint8_t aes_gf28_mulx( uint8_t x ) {
2     if( ( x & 0x80 ) == 0x80 ) {
3         return 0x1B ^ ( x << 1 );
4     }
5     else {
6         return ( x << 1 );
7     }
8 }
```

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (4)

\mathbb{F}_{2^8} and $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}^{4 \times 4}$

- Given $x, y \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, to compute

$$r = x \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} y$$

we could

- use polynomial multiplication to compute $x(x) \cdot y(x)$ then reduce this modulo $p(x)$, or
- use `aes_gf28_mulx` to reduce intermediate results modulo $p(x)$ during said polynomial multiplication

in both cases adopting a left-to-right binary (or bit-serial) approach to multiplication.

Listing

```

1 uint8_t aes_gf28_mul( uint8_t x, uint8_t y ) {
2     uint8_t t = 0;
3
4     for( int i = 7; i >= 0; i-- ) {
5         t = aes_gf28_mulx( t );
6
7         if( ( y >> i ) & 1 ) {
8             t ^= x;
9         }
10    }
11
12    return t;
13 }
```

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (4)

\mathbb{F}_{2^8} and $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}^{4 \times 4}$

- Given $x, y \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, to compute

$$r = x \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} y$$

we could

- use polynomial multiplication to compute $x(x) \cdot y(x)$ then reduce this modulo $p(x)$, or
- use `aes_gf28_mulx` to reduce intermediate results modulo $p(x)$ during said polynomial multiplication

in both cases adopting a left-to-right binary (or bit-serial) approach to multiplication.

Listing

```

1 uint8_t aes_gf28_mul( uint8_t x, uint8_t y ) {
2     uint16_t t = 0;
3
4     for( int i = 7; i >= 0; i-- ) {
5         t <<= 1;
6
7         if( ( y >> i ) & 1 ) {
8             t ^= x;
9         }
10    }
11
12    for( int i = 15; i >= 8; i-- ) {
13        if( ( t >> i ) & 1 ) {
14            t ^= 0x1B << ( i - 8 );
15        }
16    }
17
18    return t & 0xFF;
19 }
```

Notes:

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Part 2: in practice (5)

\mathbb{F}_{2^8} and $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}^{4 \times 4}$

- Given $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, to compute

$$r = 1 \oslash_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x$$

we could

- use the (binary) extended Euclidean algorithm, i.e., compute

$$r(x) = x \text{gcd}(x(x), p(x))$$

or

- use Lagrange's theorem, i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} x^q &\equiv x & \in \mathbb{F}_q \\ x^{q-1} &\equiv 1 & \in \mathbb{F}_q \\ x^{q-2} &\equiv x^{-1} & \in \mathbb{F}_q \end{aligned}$$

where in this case $q = 2^8 = 256$.

Listing

```

1 uint8_t aes_gf28_inv( uint8_t x ) {
2     if( x == 0 ) {
3         return 0;
4     }
5     else {
6         uint16_t U = 0x11B, V = x, A = 0, C = 1;
7
8         do {
9             while( !( U & 1 ) ) {
10                 if( A & 1 ) {
11                     A ^= 0x011B;
12                 }
13                 U >>= 1; A >>= 1;
14             }
15
16             while( !( V & 1 ) ) {
17                 if( C & 1 ) {
18                     C ^= 0x011B;
19                 }
20                 V >>= 1; C >>= 1;
21             }
22
23             if( U < V ) {
24                 V ^= U; C ^= A;
25             }
26             else {
27                 U ^= V; A ^= C;
28             }
29         } while( U );
30
31         return C;
32     }
33 }
```

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Part 2: in practice (5)

\mathbb{F}_{2^8} and $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}^{4 \times 4}$

- Given $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, to compute

$$r = 1 \oslash_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x$$

we could

- use the (binary) extended Euclidean algorithm, i.e., compute

$$r(x) = x \text{gcd}(x(x), p(x))$$

or

- use Lagrange's theorem, i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} x^q &\equiv x & \in \mathbb{F}_q \\ x^{q-1} &\equiv 1 & \in \mathbb{F}_q \\ x^{q-2} &\equiv x^{-1} & \in \mathbb{F}_q \end{aligned}$$

where in this case $q = 2^8 = 256$.

Listing

```

1 uint8_t aes_gf28_inv( uint8_t x ) {
2     uint8_t t_0 = aes_gf28_mul( x, x ); // x^2
3     uint8_t t_1 = aes_gf28_mul( t_0, x ); // x^3
4     t_0 = aes_gf28_mul( t_0, t_0 ); // x^4
5     t_1 = aes_gf28_mul( t_1, t_0 ); // x^7
6     t_0 = aes_gf28_mul( t_0, t_0 ); // x^8
7     t_0 = aes_gf28_mul( t_1, t_0 ); // x^15
8     t_0 = aes_gf28_mul( t_0, t_0 ); // x^30
9     t_0 = aes_gf28_mul( t_0, t_0 ); // x^60
10    t_1 = aes_gf28_mul( t_1, t_0 ); // x^127
11    t_0 = aes_gf28_mul( t_0, t_1 ); // x^254
12    t_0 = aes_gf28_mul( t_0, t_0 );
13
14    return t_0;
15 }
```

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (6)

\mathbb{F}_{2^8} and $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}^{4 \times 4}$

- Given $x \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}$, to compute

$$r = \text{S-box}(x)$$

we

- compute g using `aes_gf28_inv`, then
- compute f by aligning coefficients in x (plus a constant) such that adding them produces the required result.

Listing

```

1 uint8_t aes_enc_sbox( uint8_t x ) {
2     x = aes_gf28_inv( x );
3
4     x = ( 0x63 ) ^ // 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
5     ( x ) ^ // x_7 x_6 x_5 x_4 x_3 x_2 x_1 x_0
6     ( x << 1 ) ^ // x_6 x_5 x_4 x_3 x_2 x_1 x_0 0
7     ( x << 2 ) ^ // x_5 x_4 x_3 x_2 x_1 x_0 0 0
8     ( x << 3 ) ^ // x_4 x_3 x_2 x_1 x_0 0 0 0
9     ( x << 4 ) ^ // x_3 x_2 x_1 x_0 0 0 0 0
10    ( x >> 7 ) ^ // 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x_7
11    ( x >> 6 ) ^ // 0 0 0 0 0 0 x_7 x_6
12    ( x >> 5 ) ^ // 0 0 0 0 0 0 x_7 x_6 x_5
13    ( x >> 4 ) ; // 0 0 0 0 x_7 x_6 x_5 x_4
14
15    return x;
16 }
```

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (7)

Strategy #1

► Strategy #1 [2, Section 4.1]:

- use pure software (i.e., via ISA),
- adopt an unpacked representation of state and round key matrices, using (an array of 16) 8-bit bytes, i.e., instances of type `uint8_t`,
- favour use of iterative (i.e., rolled) loops,
- compute (or evolve) round keys,
- compute round functions.

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (8)

Strategy #1

► Selective pre-computation can be effective

$$\begin{array}{lll} \text{multiplication-by-x} & : & \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \rightsquigarrow 256B \text{ look-up table} \\ \text{division-by-x} & : & \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \rightsquigarrow 256B \text{ look-up table} \\ \text{round constants} & : & \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \rightsquigarrow NrB \text{ look-up table} \\ \text{S-box} & : & \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \rightsquigarrow 256B \text{ look-up table} \end{array}$$

noting that various (sub-)options exist for the S-box, e.g.,

Pre-compute	Compute	Footprint	Applicability	
			ENC	DEC
g	$f \circ g$	0B	✓	✓
f	f	256B	✓	✓
$f \circ g$	g	256B	✓	✗
		256B	✓	✗

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (9)

Strategy #1

Listing

```
1 void aes_enc_rnd_key( uint8_t* s, const uint8_t* rk ) {
2     for( int i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) {
3         s[ i ] = s[ i ] ^ rk[ i ];
4     }
5 }
```

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Part 2: in practice (9)

Strategy #1

Listing

```
1 void aes_enc_rnd_sub( uint8_t* s ) {
2     for( int i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) {
3         s[ i ] = aes_enc_sbox( s[ i ] );
4     }
5 }
```

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Part 2: in practice (9)

Strategy #1

Listing

```
1 void aes_enc_rnd_row( uint8_t* s ) {
2     AES_ENC_RND_ROW_STEP( 0x1, 0x5, 0x9, 0xD,
3                             0xD, 0x1, 0x5, 0x9 );
4     AES_ENC_RND_ROW_STEP( 0x2, 0x6, 0xA, 0xE,
5                             0xA, 0xE, 0x2, 0x6 );
6     AES_ENC_RND_ROW_STEP( 0x3, 0x7, 0xB, 0xF,
7                             0x7, 0xB, 0xF, 0x3 );
8 }
```

Notes:

Listing

```
1 #define AES_ENC_RND_ROW_STEP(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) { \
2     uint8_t __a1 = s[ a ]; \
3     uint8_t __b1 = s[ b ]; \
4     uint8_t __c1 = s[ c ]; \
5     uint8_t __d1 = s[ d ]; \
6     \
7     s[ e ] = __a1; \
8     s[ f ] = __b1; \
9     s[ g ] = __c1; \
10    s[ h ] = __d1; \
11 }
```

Part 2: in practice (9)

Strategy #1

Listing

```
1 void aes_enc_rnd_mix( uint8_t* s ) {
2     for( int i = 0; i < 4; i++ , s += 4 ) {
3         AES_ENC_RND_MIX_STEP( 0x0, 0x1, 0x2, 0x3 );
4     }
5 }
```

Notes:

Listing

```
1 #define AES_ENC_RND_MIX_STEP(a,b,c,d) { \
2     uint8_t __a1 = s[ a ], __a2 = aes_gf28_mulx( __a1 ); \
3     uint8_t __b1 = s[ b ], __b2 = aes_gf28_mulx( __b1 ); \
4     uint8_t __c1 = s[ c ], __c2 = aes_gf28_mulx( __c1 ); \
5     uint8_t __d1 = s[ d ], __d2 = aes_gf28_mulx( __d1 ); \
6     \
7     uint8_t __a3 = __a1 ^ __a2; \
8     uint8_t __b3 = __b1 ^ __b2; \
9     uint8_t __c3 = __c1 ^ __c2; \
10    uint8_t __d3 = __d1 ^ __d2; \
11    \
12    s[ a ] = __a2 ^ __b3 ^ __c1 ^ __d1; \
13    s[ b ] = __a1 ^ __b2 ^ __c3 ^ __d1; \
14    s[ c ] = __a1 ^ __b1 ^ __c2 ^ __d3; \
15    s[ d ] = __a3 ^ __b1 ^ __c1 ^ __d2; \
16 }
```

Part 2: in practice (10)

Strategy #1

Listing

```
1 void aes_enc( uint8_t* c, const uint8_t* m, const uint8_t* k ) {
2     uint8_t s[ 4 * AES_128_NB ];
3     uint8_t rk[ 4 * AES_128_NB ];
4
5     memcpy( s, m, ( 4 * AES_128_NB ) * sizeof( uint8_t ) );
6     memcpy( rk, k, ( 4 * AES_128_NB ) * sizeof( uint8_t ) );
7
8     //      1 initial round
9     aes_enc_rnd_key( s, rk );
10    // Nr - 1 interated rounds
11    for( int r = 1; r < AES_128_NR; r++ ) {
12        aes_enc_key_evolve( rk, rk, aes_rcon( r ) );
13        aes_enc_rnd_sub( s );
14        aes_enc_rnd_row( s );
15        aes_enc_rnd_mix( s );
16        aes_enc_rnd_key( s, rk );
17    }
18    //      1 final round
19    aes_enc_key_evolve( rk, rk, aes_rcon( AES_128_NR ) );
20    aes_enc_rnd_sub( s );
21    aes_enc_rnd_row( s );
22    aes_enc_rnd_key( s, rk );
23
24    memcpy( c, s, ( 4 * AES_128_NB ) * sizeof( uint8_t ) );
25 }
```

Notes:

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Part 2: in practice (11)

Strategy #2

► Strategy #2 [2, Section 4.2] (aka. T-tables):

- use pure software (i.e., via ISA),
- adopt a column-packed representation of state and round key matrices, using (a set of 4) 32-bit words, i.e., instances of type `uint32_t`,
- favour use of straight-line (i.e., unrolled) loops,
- pre-compute (or expand) round keys,
- pre-compute round functions.

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Part 2: in practice (12)

Strategy #2

- Idea: pre-compute most of the round, i.e.,

`MixColumns` \circ `ShiftRows` \circ `SubBytes`.

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Part 2: in practice (12)

Strategy #2

- Idea: pre-compute most of the round, i.e.,

`MixColumns` \circ `ShiftRows` \circ `SubBytes`.

- Step #1: we already know applying `MixColumns` will yield

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix}$$

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Part 2: in practice (12)

Strategy #2

- **Idea:** pre-compute most of the round, i.e.,

`MixColumns` \circ `ShiftRows` \circ `SubBytes`.

- **Step #1:** we already know applying `MixColumns` will yield

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} (\mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)}) \\ (\mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)}) \\ (\mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)}) \\ (\mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)}) \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} (\mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)}) \end{bmatrix}$$

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (12)

Strategy #2

- **Idea:** pre-compute most of the round, i.e.,

`MixColumns` \circ `ShiftRows` \circ `SubBytes`.

- **Step #1:** we already know applying `MixColumns` will yield

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{1,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{2,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)} \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix}$$

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (12)

Strategy #2

- **Idea:** pre-compute most of the round, i.e.,

`MixColumns` \circ `ShiftRows` \circ `SubBytes`.

- **Step #2:** an equivalent RHS can be formed from pre-computed look-up tables, i.e.,

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} T_0[s_{0,j}^{(r)}] & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} & T_1[s_{1,j}^{(r)}] & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \\ T_2[s_{2,j}^{(r)}] & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} & T_3[s_{3,j}^{(r)}] & \end{bmatrix}$$

where

$$T_0[x] = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \end{bmatrix} \quad T_1[x] = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T_2[x] = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \end{bmatrix} \quad T_3[x] = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} x \end{bmatrix}$$

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (12)

Strategy #2

- **Idea:** pre-compute most of the round, i.e.,

`MixColumns` \circ `ShiftRows` \circ `SubBytes`.

- **Step #3:** `ShiftRows` and `SubBytes` can then be folded into the tables and look-ups, i.e.,

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_{0,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{1,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{2,j}^{(r)} \\ s_{3,j}^{(r)} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} T_0[s_{0,j+0}^{(r)} \pmod{Nr}] & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} & T_1[s_{1,j+1}^{(r)} \pmod{Nr}] & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \\ T_2[s_{2,j+2}^{(r)} \pmod{Nr}] & \oplus_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} & T_3[s_{3,j+3}^{(r)} \pmod{Nr}] & \end{bmatrix}$$

where

$$T_0[x] = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \end{bmatrix} \quad T_1[x] = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$T_2[x] = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \end{bmatrix} \quad T_3[x] = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{01} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{03} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \\ \mathbf{02} \otimes_{\mathbb{F}_{2^8}} \text{S-box}(x) \end{bmatrix}$$

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (12)

Strategy #2

Part 2: in practice (13)

Strategy #2

Listing

```
1 #define AES_ENC_RND_INIT() { \
2     t_0 = rkp[ 0 ] ^ s_0; \
3     t_1 = rkp[ 1 ] ^ s_1; \
4     t_2 = rkp[ 2 ] ^ s_2; \
5     t_3 = rkp[ 3 ] ^ s_3; \
6     \
7     rkp += AES_128_NB; s_0 = t_0; s_1 = t_1; s_2 = t_2; s_3 = t_3; \
8 }
```

Notes:

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Part 2: in practice (13)

Strategy #2

Listing

```
1 #define AES_ENC_RND_ITER() { \
2     t_0 = rkp[ 0 ] ^ ( AES_ENC_TBOX_0[ ( s_0 >> 0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
3         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_1[ ( s_1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
4         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_2[ ( s_2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
5         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_3[ ( s_3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] ) ; \ \
6     t_1 = rkp[ 1 ] ^ ( AES_ENC_TBOX_0[ ( s_1 >> 0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
7         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_1[ ( s_2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
8         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_2[ ( s_3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
9         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_3[ ( s_0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] ) ; \ \
10    t_2 = rkp[ 2 ] ^ ( AES_ENC_TBOX_0[ ( s_2 >> 0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
11        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_1[ ( s_3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
12        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_2[ ( s_0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
13        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_3[ ( s_1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] ) ; \ \
14    t_3 = rkp[ 3 ] ^ ( AES_ENC_TBOX_0[ ( s_3 >> 0 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
15        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_1[ ( s_0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
16        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_2[ ( s_1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] ) ^ \ \
17        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_3[ ( s_2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] ) ; \ \
18     \
19     rkp += AES_128_NB; s_0 = t_0; s_1 = t_1; s_2 = t_2; s_3 = t_3; \
20 }
```

Notes:

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Part 2: in practice (13)

Strategy #2

Listing

```
1 #define AES_ENC_RND_FINI() {  
2     t_0 = rkp[ 0 ] ^ ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_0 >> 0 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x000000FF ) ^ \  
3         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_1 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x0000FF00 ) ^ \  
4         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_2 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x00FF0000 ) ^ \  
5         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_3 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] & 0xFF000000 ) ; \  
6     t_1 = rkp[ 1 ] ^ ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_1 >> 0 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x000000FF ) ^ \  
7         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_2 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x0000FF00 ) ^ \  
8         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_3 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x00FF0000 ) ^ \  
9         ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_0 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] & 0xF0000000 ) ; \  
10    t_2 = rkp[ 2 ] ^ ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_2 >> 0 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x000000FF ) ^ \  
11        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_3 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x0000FF00 ) ^ \  
12        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_0 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x00FF0000 ) ^ \  
13        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_1 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] & 0xF0000000 ) ; \  
14    t_3 = rkp[ 3 ] ^ ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_3 >> 0 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x000000FF ) ^ \  
15        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_0 >> 8 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x0000FF00 ) ^ \  
16        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_1 >> 16 ) & 0xFF ] & 0x00FF0000 ) ^ \  
17        ( AES_ENC_TBOX_4[ ( s_2 >> 24 ) & 0xFF ] & 0xFF000000 ) ; \  
18  
19    rkp += AES_128_NB; s_0 = t_0; s_1 = t_1; s_2 = t_2; s_3 = t_3; \  
20 }
```

Notes:

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Part 2: in practice (14)

Strategy #2

Listing

```
1 void aes_enc( uint8_t* c, const uint8_t* m, const uint8_t* rk ) {  
2     uint32_t s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, t_0, t_1, t_2, t_3;  
3  
4     U8_TO_U32_LE( s_0, m, 0 ); U8_TO_U32_LE( s_1, m, 4 );  
5     U8_TO_U32_LE( s_2, m, 8 ); U8_TO_U32_LE( s_3, m, 12 );  
6  
7     uint32_t *rkp = ( uint32_t* )( rk );  
8  
9     //      1 initial round  
10    AES_ENC_RND_INIT();  
11    // Nr - 1 interated rounds  
12    for( int i = 1; i < AES_128_NR; i++ ) {  
13        AES_ENC_RND_ITER();  
14    }  
15    //      1 final round  
16    AES_ENC_RND_FINI();  
17  
18    U32_TO_U8_LE( c, s_0, 0 ); U32_TO_U8_LE( c, s_1, 4 );  
19    U32_TO_U8_LE( c, s_2, 8 ); U32_TO_U8_LE( c, s_3, 12 );  
20 }
```

Notes:

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Part 2: in practice (15)

Strategy #3

► Strategy #3 [7] (i.e., Intel AES-NI):


- use hybrid of software (i.e., via ISA) and hardware (i.e., via ISE),
- adopt a fully-packed representation of state and round key matrices, using 128-bit words, i.e., instances of type `__m128i`,
- favour use of straight-line (i.e., unrolled) loops,
- pre-compute (or expand) round keys,
- compute round functions.

Notes:

Part 2: in practice (16)

Strategy #3

Circuit (aesenc [6, Pages 3-54–3-55])




Notes:

Part 2: in practice (16)

Strategy #3

Circuit (aesenclast [6, Pages 3-56–3-57])



Notes:

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
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Part 2: in practice (16)

Strategy #3

Circuit (aeskeygenassist [6, Pages 3-59–3-60])



Notes:

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Listing

```

1 void aes_enc( uint8_t* c, const uint8_t* m, const uint8_t* rk ) {
2     __m128i s = _mm_load_si128( ( __m128i* )( m ) );
3     __m128i* rkp = ( __m128i* )( rk );
4
5     //      1 initial round
6     s = _mm_xor_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
7     // Nr - 1 iterated rounds
8     s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
9     s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
10    s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
11    s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
12    s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
13    s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
14    s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
15    s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
16    s = _mm_aesenc_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
17    //      1 final round
18    s = _mm_aesenclast_si128( s, _mm_load_si128( rkp++ ) );
19
20    _mm_store_si128( ( __m128i* )( c ), s );
21 }

```

Notes:

Conclusions

Foot-Shooting Prevention Agreement

I, _____, promise that once
Your Name

I see how simple AES really is, I will
not implement it in production code
even though it would be really fun.

This agreement shall be in effect
until the undersigned creates a
meaningful interpretive dance that
compares and contrasts cache-based,
timing, and other side channel attacks
and their countermeasures.



Signature Date

Notes:

- **Take away points:** you can often simply use

$$c = \text{AES-128.ENC}(k, m),$$

but understanding internals of this primitive can be useful and/or important.

- some historically interesting aspects; some “portable” concepts,
- close relationship between primitive and underlying Mathematics,
- wide range of viable implementation strategies,
- extensive deployment, in various contexts and use-cases.

Notes:

Additional Reading

- *Wikipedia: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)*. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard.
- *Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)*. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 197-upd1. 2023. URL: <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197-upd1>.
- L.R. Knudsen and M.J.B. Robshaw. *The Block Cipher Companion*. Springer, 2011.
- J. Daemen and V. Rijmen. *The Design of Rijndael*. Springer, 2002.

Notes:

References

- [1] *Wikipedia: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)*. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard (see p. 107).
- [2] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen. *The Design of Rijndael*. Springer, 2002 (see pp. 5, 57, 71, 107).
- [3] L.R. Knudsen and M.J.B. Robshaw. *The Block Cipher Companion*. Springer, 2011 (see p. 107).
- [4] J. Daemen, L. Knudsen, and V. Rijmen. “The block cipher Square”. In: *Fast Software Encryption (FSE)*. LNCS 1267. Springer-Verlag, 1997, pp. 149–165 (see p. 5).
- [5] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen. “The Block Cipher Rijndael”. In: *Smart Card Research and Applications (CARDIS)*. LNCS 1820. Springer-Verlag, 1998, pp. 277–284 (see p. 5).
- [6] *Intel 64 and IA-32 architectures – Software Developer’s Manual (Volume 2: Instruction Set Reference A-Z)*. Tech. rep. 325383-071US. Intel Corp., 2019. URL: <http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sdm> (see pp. 95, 97, 99).
- [7] *Intel Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Instructions Set*. Tech. rep. Intel Corp., 2012. URL: <http://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/article/165683/aes-wp-2012-09-22-v01.pdf> (see p. 93).
- [8] *Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)*. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 197-upd1. 2023. URL: <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197-upd1> (see pp. 5, 9, 11, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 107).

Notes: